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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to compare the effectiveness of monetary policy between civil-
law countries and common-law countries by investigating the impulse response of monetary 
policy actions on the level of output.  This is to determine whether countries of common-law 
origin are less sensitive to monetary policy actions compared with civil-law countries.  
Theoretically, we expected that monetary policy is more effective in civil-law countries where 
their financial structures are more bank-based as compared to common-law countries where 
their financial structures are more market-based. The impulse response functions were 
generated through the estimation of first-differences VAR consisting of five variables.  The 
findings show the impact of monetary policy is relatively stronger, responds more quickly and 
long lasting in civil-law countries compared with common-law countries.   
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Introduction 
 
In the credit view, the channel of monetary transmission mechanism can be divided into two; 
the bank lending channel, and the balance sheet channel. The former is related to banks’ 
ability and the latter to their willingness to supply loans to the private sector. In contrast with 
traditional theories, the credit view focuses on the importance of banks in transmitting 
monetary policy actions. This is based on the fact that the banking sector serves as the main 
source of finance for both households and firms, thus changes in banks loan could have 
consequences on the total output through its effect on private sector spending. The credit 
view, however, relies on the assumption of imperfect capital markets, which implies that the 
effects of monetary policy may differ between firms, industries or countries. This means that 
differences in countries’ financial structures may have different impacts from monetary policy 
impulses. Meanwhile, the differences in financial structure across countries could be related 
to their legal structures. This argument draws from the work of La Porta et al. (1997), who 
focus on the relationship between legal structure and finance. In their paper, La Porta et al. 
show that the variations in the financial structures across countries are related to differences in 
the countries’ legal systems. Cecchetti (1999), by using the La Porta et al. argument and the 
credit view of monetary policy has investigated the possibility that the legal system in a 
country has an influence on the impact of monetary policy on output and prices.   In a study of 
eleven European Union countries, Cecchetti found that a country’s legal structure, financial 
structure, and monetary transmission mechanism are interconnected. Specifically, the study 
found that in countries with better legal protection for shareholders and debtors, the impact of 
an interest rate change on output and inflation is lower.  
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between countries’ legal structure 
and the performance of monetary policy.  Specifically, the objective of this paper is to 
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determine whether there is any difference in the effectiveness of monetary policy actions 
between countries with different legal structures, that is, between civil- and common-law 
countries. This is based on the fact that empirical studies that directly look at the relationship 
between legal structure and monetary policy effectiveness are very limited. Thus, there are 
several questions related to this relationship that need further clarification, and this has 
motivated this study. The is because the finding from Cecchetti (1999) on the issue is far from 
conclusive, due to the fact that his study only focuses on 11 developed countries of European 
Union where the development of the financial sector is relatively similar.  In this regard, the 
question of interest is whether the similar findings can be observed if the sample in the study 
is extended to include both developed and developing countries. With a different level of 
financial development and growth pattern among countries, this study with a larger sample 
and covering both developed and developing countries is expected to provide more 
information on the effectiveness of monetary policy in civil-law countries and common-law 
countries.  
 
In this paper, the relationship between legal structures and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy was investigated in a larger sample of 24 countries. The sample consists of 12 civil-law 
countries and 12 common-law countries. Out of 12 countries of civil-law tradition, 8 are 
developing countries, while for common-law countries, there are 6 developing countries.  The 
impulse responses of a monetary policy shock on output have been estimated for individual 
countries and then comparisons have been carried out between civil and common-law 
countries.   
 
Literature Review 
Financial Structure and Monetary Policy 
 
Financial structure refers to the nature of the components that make up a financial system. 
Allen and Gale (2001) identify these components as the agents in the system, financial 
institutions, financial markets, the central bank, the regulatory authority, the political system 
(that is, government and its policies), the legal system (particularly contract enforcement and 
governance mechanisms), custom (that is, the importance of reputation and other implicit 
mechanisms for contract enforcement), accounting systems, and the nature of the incentive to 
generate and disseminate information. Empirically, Levine (2002) measures financial 
structure by constructing an index that reflects the aggregate size, activity, and efficiency of 
the financial institutions sector relative to the financial markets sector of the country.   
 
Based on Levine, Tadesse (2001) uses a dummy variable to classify a financial system as 
either market-based or bank-based.  If Levine’s conglomerate index of size, activity, and 
efficiency for a country is above the mean value of the index then Tadesse classifies the 
country as having a bank-based financial system. If the index is below the mean then Tadesse 
classifies the financial system as market-based. Cecchetti (1999) focuses on the structural 
aspects of the financial systems that are important for the transmission mechanism.  He 
constructs an aggregate index of financial structure based on the size and concentration of the 
banking sector, the health of the banking system, and the relative amount of credit allocated 
through banks. These are the financial variables that the lending view of the transmission 
mechanism suggests should be important.  
 
Empirical findings clearly indicate that the nature of the transmission mechanism is 
influenced by the structure of a country's financial system. Cecchetti (1999), for example, 
investigates the importance of firms' dependence on bank loans for the effectiveness of policy 
changes. He looks at how differences in the size, concentration, and health of the banking 
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systems, across a sample of 16 countries, are likely to affect the impact of monetary policy 
and concludes that countries with many small banks, less healthy bank systems, and poorer 
direct capital access display a greater sensitivity to policy changes than do countries with big 
healthy banks and deep, well-developed capital markets.  Allen and Gale (2001) look at the 
evidence related to differences in financial structure and growth between countries over a long 
average period of time. They find that, in general, financial structure does affect aggregate 
real economic variables. Meanwhile, Cecchetti and Krause (2001) study the issue of whether 
financial structure affects the effectiveness of monetary policy. Cecchetti and Krause look at 
23 developed and emerging market countries and find that financial structure does matter. 
Specifically, countries with less direct state ownership of banking system assets have lower 
variances of both output and inflation.   
 
Legal Structure and Monetary Policy 
 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) found that a country's legal system is related to its financial 
structure.  According to La Porta et al., investors provide capital to firms only if they believe 
they will get their money back. For equity holders, this means that they must be able to vote 
out directors and managers who do not pay them. For creditors and holders of bonds, this 
means that they must have authority to repossess collateral.  Furthermore, these legal rights 
must be accompanied by confidence that the laws will be enforced. In countries where these 
protections are strong, equity and bond markets are broad and deep and primary capital 
markets will be important. By contrast, in countries where investor protections are weak, 
finance will come primarily through the banking system. Specifically, La Porta et al. 
examined the relationship between shareholders’ rights, creditor rights, and enforcement on 
the one hand and the concentration of ownership and availability of external finance on the 
other, and came to two conclusions.  La Porta et al. found that civil-law give investors weaker 
legal rights than common-laws do. Common-law countries give both shareholders and 
creditors the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, protection. German-civil-
law and Scandinavian countries generally fall between the other two.  The quality of law 
enforcement is the highest in Scandinavian and German-civil-law countries, next highest in 
common-law countries, and again the lowest in French-civil-law countries.   
 
In addition, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) also found that, first, corporate ownership is more 
concentrated in countries where shareholders and creditors are poorly protected by both the 
substance of the law and its enforcement. Second, countries with weaker legal rules and less 
rigorous law enforcement have smaller and narrower capital markets. The findings suggest 
that English common-law countries have the least concentration of corporate ownership and 
the largest and deepest capital markets. Meanwhile, French civil-law countries have the most 
concentrated ownership and the smallest capital markets. In line with La Porta et al., 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1999) also found that countries with common-law tradition were 
more market-based while countries with a French civil-law tradition have been found to be 
more bank-based, suggesting that financial structure is not independent of the legal structure 
used by the system. These findings clearly indicate that legal structure shapes the financial 
structure of the countries. Given the importance of banks in the monetary transmission 
process, this leads the author to conclude that country legal structure is important for 
monetary policy effectiveness.   
 
With regard to the effects of monetary policy on economic activities, empirical studies found 
that the effectiveness of monetary policy varied considerably among countries. Gerlach and 
Smets (1995), for example, found that the effects of a change in the monetary shock on output 
were somewhat larger in Germany than in France or Italy, while the United Kingdom fell 
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somewhere in between. However, the differences in the transmission of monetary policy 
documented in the Gerlach-Smets study were not very large.  Meanwhile, Barran et al. (1996) 
found that the effect of a contractionary monetary shock on output is relatively long lasting in 
Germany, with output bottoming out about 10 quarters after the shock, somewhat less long 
lasting in the United Kingdom with output bottoming out after about 8 quarters, whilst in 
France output reaches the through about 6 quarters after the shock. Dornbusch et al. (1998) 
estimate the impact of a coordinated monetary policy move on activity in a group of EU 
countries, controlling for intra-European exchange rates. They find that the `impact-effects’ of 
a change in monetary policy are similar in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, but 
smaller than in Sweden and Italy. The full effects of the coordinated monetary policy move 
are, however, lower in the United Kingdom than in Germany and France, a result that is 
broadly consistent with that of Britton and Whitley (1997). Ramaswamy and Sløk (1998) 
looked at the speed of adjustment to an unanticipated contraction in monetary policy.  Using 
the VAR approach, they found that the EU countries fall into two broad groups as far as the 
transmission of monetary policy is concerned.  In one group (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom, output typically bottoms out about 11 to 12 
quarters following a contractionary monetary shock. In the other group (Denmark, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden), output typically bottoms out about 5 to 6 quarters after a 
contractionary monetary shock.  
     
Methodology 
Estimation Strategy 
 
In this paper, the effectiveness of monetary policy actions in the countries being studied are 
examined by using impulse response functions. In order to calculate the impulse responses, 
this study employs a vector autoregression (VAR) approach. Meanwhile, there is a serious 
reason to question the finding of time series studies that do not properly account for unit roots 
in the data. Failing to account for the presence of unit roots can lead to inconsistent coefficient 
estimates and result in wrong inferences being drawn.  Phillips (1998) criticised the use of 
levels VARs in the presence of some unit roots or some near-unit roots in order to derive 
impulse responses. He showed that long run impulse response estimates are inconsistent in 
unrestricted levels VARs. Many macroeconomic variables are well described by unit root 
processes so this criticism should be taken seriously.  Thus, this paper first examines the unit 
root properties of each series of the VAR model. The presence of unit roots has been tested by 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron tests (PP).  In 
general, the findings from unit root tests show that most of the series are nonstationary in 
levels but stationary in the first differences. This finding suggests the first differences VAR is 
more appropriate than levels VAR to model the series.   
 
In order to derive impulse responses, a set of identifying restrictions has to be imposed.  There 
are two approaches that are widely used to achieve identification of the shocks.  The first 
approach is based on imposing restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of shocks, while 
the second approach is based on imposing long-run restrictions on the effects of shocks. To 
impose contemporaneous restrictions, the standard approach is a Choleski decomposition of 
the residual covariance matrix from the VAR model. This approach imposes a 
contemporaneous recursive structure on the shocks that depends in a crucial way on the 
ordering of the variables in the system.  The ordering reflects the speed at which variables 
respond to shocks.  The literature on monetary transmissions has suggested several different 
orderings.  However, there is no agreement on the ordering because different economic 
theories imply different orderings.  Meanwhile, an example of a long run identifying 
assumption could be that nominal shocks have no effects on real output. The arguments for 
Jurnal Kemanusiaan bil.9, Jun 2007 
 11
imposing certain restrictions are usually based on economic theory, and depending on the 
theory, different long run restrictions have been proposed.  This paper will not follow the 
approach of imposing long run restrictions in order to achieve identification of the shocks. 
Instead restrictions will be imposed on the contemporaneous effects of shocks.   
 
Model and Data Set 
 
This paper employs a VAR approach of which the main characteristic is a relatively small 
number of variables describing the dynamic of the economy. Commonly, a macroeconomic 
VAR model to study monetary policy shocks will include at least four variables: output, price, 
money, and short-term interest rate. These correspond to the variables of a standard IS-LM 
model.  The four-variable VAR model, however, often results in the price puzzle, which is a 
finding of a sustained price rise following an unanticipated monetary tightening represented 
by a positive innovation of the interest rate.  Sims (1992) argued that the price puzzle is a 
result of omitting variables which the monetary authority observes to obtain information on 
future inflationary pressures, and suggested that it could be resolved by including the 
exchange rate and commodity price in the set of variables. Meanwhile, to formalise the credit 
view, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) suggest that the VAR model should also include the loan 
price and the loan quantity in the set of variables to model.  Based on the above discussion, a 
complete VAR model should consist of the prices and quantities of the three markets (goods, 
money and credit market) as well as the exchange rate and the commodity price.  However, 
due to the limitations of the data, the VAR model in this paper only has five variables.  The 
vector of endogenous variables of the VAR model used in estimation is as follows:  
 
 V’ = [ vt   pt    rt    crt   xt   ]      (1) 
 
where v is the level of output, p is the price level, r is a short term interest rate, cr is credit, 
and x is the exchange rate. The monetary policy shock is identified through a standard 
Choleski-decomposition with the ordering of variables as in Equation 1. The ordering of 
endogenous variables in Equation 1 is fairly standard in the recent empirical literature of 
transmission of monetary policy shocks. This ordering is based on the assumption regarding 
the operation of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. The underlying assumption is that 
policy shocks have no contemporaneous impact on output and prices, but may affect credit 
and the exchange rate immediately. However, the policy interest rate does not respond to 
contemporaneous changes in credit and the exchange rate. Specifically, output (v) is placed 
before all other variables means that the other variables can affect v only with lags.  
Meanwhile, price (p) is placed before the interest rate (r), which implies that r can affect p 
with lags. The ordering also allows contemporaneous changes in r to influence cr and x.   
 
For each country, the VAR model is estimated by using quarterly data over the period 1980-
2003.  In certain countries, due to the limitation of the data, the slightly shorter data periods 
have been used in the estimation. The main sources of data are the International Financial 
Statistics of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Development Indicators 2004 of 
World Bank.  Specifically, the quarterly data for price (p), measured by Consumer Price 
Index, CPI (base year 2000); interest rate (r), measured by lending rate; credit (cr), measured 
by domestic credit; and the exchange rate (x), measured by nominal effective exchange rate 
(for France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, the exchange rate has been measured by real 
effective exchange rate), were collected from Financial Statistics.  This study uses the lending 
rate as the monetary policy rate as this is the only short term interest rate available for the all 
countries being studied over the whole sample period. Meanwhile, annual data for output (y) 
is measured by real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) were gathered from World Bank 
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Indicators.  These annual data have been converted into quarterly data by using SPLINE 
methods in the EXPAND procedure provided by SAS/ETS (SAS/ETS User’s Guide, 1993). 
 
In this paper, there are 12 common-law countries and 12 civil-law countries in the sample 
(Appendix 1). The selection and the number of countries used for the study were determined 
solely based on the availability of the data.  Meanwhile, the classification of the country’s 
legal structure is based on La Porta et al. (1997) which found that the nature of the laws is a 
product of the legal tradition on which the civil codes of a country are based. This study will 
only focus on two legal structures, civil-law and common-law, due to the fact that these are 
the major legal frameworks in the world. In all estimations, the data are expressed in logs, and 
the estimation was carried out by using statistical software E-View. The lag lengths in all 
regressions were determined by using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwartz 
Information Criteria (SIC). Based on AIC and BIC, we find the most appropriate lag length is 
4 quarters.  Experimenting with longer lag lengths, especially lag 6 and lag 8, generally did 
not improve the results except in certain cases.  
 
Theoretically, we expect that monetary policies will be more effective in civil-law countries 
compared with common-law countries. The prediction is based on the argument that civil-law 
countries have been found to be more bank-based while common-law countries are more 
market-based (see La Porta et al. 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).  In other words, 
the financial sector of civil-law countries is dominated by banking institutions and their 
capital markets are relatively small. This is contrast with the financial sector in common-law 
countries which have relatively large and deep capital markets. This implies that monetary 
policy shifts will have a greater effect on firms in civil-law countries which mostly depend on 
bank loans compared with firms in common-law countries which have better access to the 
credit market via stock and bond markets.  With the small capital markets, firms in the civil-
law countries find it relatively more difficult to find alternative sources of finance when there 
is a shortage of supply of bank loans due to the tight monetary policy. Meanwhile, in the 
common-law countries, with the existence of relatively larger stock and capital markets, the 
substitution of bank loans is relatively much easier.  Therefore, firms in the common-law 
countries are expected to be less sensitive to monetary policy actions. 
 
Findings 
 
This section discusses the results of impulse response functions of output, investment and 
consumption for civil-law countries and common-law countries that were obtained from the 
first difference VAR model. Since the objective of this study is to examine the response of 
output to a shock in the interest rate, the focus will be on the impulse response functions and 
not on the coefficients of the VAR. The effectiveness of monetary policy in these two groups 
of countries is examined by comparing the magnitude and the speed of adjustment of output 
following a shock in interest rate.  Since the impacts of a positive shock in interest rate on 
output are expected to be negative, the size of impact in this study is evaluated by looking at 
the maximum negative impact on output.  Meanwhile, the speed of adjustment is evaluating 
by looking at the time for this negative impact to appear and the time taken for that impact to 
disappear.  In this analysis, the size of shock is an increase of one standard-deviation change 
in the interest rate, and the response of output to this shock will be investigated over a period 
of 20 quarters.  In each graph, the solid line indicates the impulse response function of output 
to a positive shock in the interest rate, and the dotted lines give a 90% confidence level of the 
impulse response. The responses of output to the shock in the interest rate for the civil-law 
countries are presented in Figure 1, whereas Figure 2 presents the impulse response functions 
for a similar shock in the case of common-law countries.     
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Figure 1 shows that in all civil-law countries, the initial impact of an increase in interest rate 
on output is negative.  This is consistent with the earlier expectation that an increase in 
interest rate would negatively affect output.  Graphs in Figure 1 show that the interest rate 
shock affects output after a lag.  In most of the cases the negative impact on output can be 
observed after the second quarter except in Mexico, Netherlands and France. In Mexico and 
Netherlands, the negative impact can only be observed after third quarter whereas for France 
after fourth quarter. Figure 1 also shows, in many cases, the maximum negative impact of 
interest rate shock on output in civil-law countries will take place between quarter 5 to 7 
except for France and Netherlands which is at quarter 8 and 9, respectively. The time taken 
for the output to reach the base line again after the negative impacts ranges from 9 to 20 
quarters except for the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the negative effect on output still can 
be observed even after quarter 20. In terms of magnitude, graphs in Figure 1 clearly show that 
the impact of interest rate shock on output is relatively large in Argentina, Chile and Peru.  
This is contrast with France, Netherlands, Philippines and Spain where the impact is almost 
negligible.  Table 1 shows the values of the maximum negative impacts of impulse response 
functions of output in civil-law countries ranged from -0.000237 to -0.002548 (Refer to 
Figure 1). 
 
As in the cases of civil-law countries, the graphs in Figure 2 show the interest rate shock in 
common-law countries affects output after a lag. However, the time taken for the effect to 
materialise is relatively longer. In Ireland, Pakistan, Singapore and United Kingdom the 
negative impact of interest rate shocks on output can be observed starting from the second 
quarter. The impact, however, takes a longer period to materialise in the case of Australia, 
Canada, and USA. In other countries (India, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Thailand), the initial impact of the interest rate shock is an increase in output.  However, this 
positive impact is only temporary and started to decline in the third quarter in case of South 
Africa, and between the fifth and sixth quarters in the case of India, Malaysia, New Zealand 
and Thailand.  After quarter 8, the responses of output in these countries turn negative except 
in the case of South Africa, where the positive response only disappears after quarter 6.  
Graphs in Figure 2 also show that the negative impact on output in common-law countries 
reaches its maximum values between quarter 5 and quarter 11.  After this period, the impulse 
response functions gradually move to the base line, and subsequently the negative impacts on 
output disappear between quarter 10 and quarter 13. Table 1 shows the values of maximum 
negative impacts on output for common-law countries ranged from -0.000146 to -0.001299. 
Inspecting the graphs in Figure 2 closely, we also find that the impact of the interest rate 
shocks on output is stronger in Canada and Singapore but relatively smaller in Ireland (Refer 
to Figure 2).    
 
By comparing the graphs in Figure 1 and Figure 2, we find that, in many cases, the response 
of output to an increase in the interest rate is relatively larger in civil-law countries than in 
common-law countries. The mean values of the maximum negative responses of output to the 
interest rate shock for civil-law countries and common-law countries as presented in Table 1 
strongly support the earlier finding based on the graphs.  From Table 1, the mean value of the 
maximum negative impacts for civil-law countries is higher than the mean value for common-
law countries. The graphs in Figure 1 and Figure 2 also show that output in the civil-law 
countries responds more quickly to the change in the interest rate compared with output in the 
common-law countries.  In most of the civil-law countries, the negative effect on output 
appears in the second quarter, while in most of the common-law countries, the negative 
impact only takes place after quarter 4.  
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This paper finds that none of the civil-law countries experienced a temporary increase in 
output due to the positive shock in the interest rate. Meanwhile, in common-law countries, the 
temporary increase in output can be observed in 5 out of 12 countries being studied. The 
temporary positive responses in these countries have delayed the negative impact of the 
interest rate on output. Summary statistics in Table 1 shows, for civil-law countries, the 
average time for the negative effects on output to appear is 2.33 quarters, whereas for 
common-law countries, the average period for the negative impact on output to take place is 
5.08 quarters.  Thus, the negative impacts of interest rate shock on output take slightly longer 
period to die out in common-law countries compared with civil-law countries.  The average 
period for the negative impact on output in common-law countries to disappear is 12 quarters, 
which is slightly longer than civil-law countries (11.5 quarters).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates whether there is a difference in the impact of monetary policy between 
two groups of countries, civil-law countries and common-law countries. Specifically, the 
paper investigates whether the effectiveness of monetary policy actions depends on the 
countries’ financial structures, which in turn depend on their differences in legal origin.   
The major finding of this paper is the impact of an increase in the interest rate on output is 
relatively stronger and responds more quickly in civil-law countries compared with common-
law countries. This finding may indicate that monetary policy is relatively more effective in 
influencing output in civil-law countries than in common-law countries. This finding is in line 
with the earlier prediction that monetary policy would be generally less effective in common-
law countries than in civil-law countries. This prediction is based on the fact that financial 
structures in most of the common-law countries are more market-based. Thus, the firms in 
these countries have relatively better access to the capital markets. Consequently, the 
substitutes for bank loans are more available in the common-law countries, and this might 
reduce the contractionary effect of monetary policy of reduction in supply of credit. The 
finding from this study is consistent with the finding from Cecchetti (1999). 
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Figure 1: Response of Output (y) to the Positive Shock  
in the Interest Rate (r) in Civil-Law Countries 
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Figure 2: Response of Output (y) to the Positive Shock  
in the Interest Rate (r) in Common-Law Countries 
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Malaysia (lag=6) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Impulse Response Functions  
of Output to the Positive Shock in the Interest Rate 
 
Responses of output (y) to interest rate shock   
 Maximum  
negative 
 impact  
 
Maximum  
positive 
 impact  
 
Time taken for 
negative impact 
to appear 
(in quarter) 
Time taken for  
negative impact 
 to disappear  
(in quarter) 
A.  Civil-law countries 
Argentina -0.002496  2 9 
Chile -0.002548  2 10 
Colombia -0.000594  2 8 
France -0.000464  4 12 
Indonesia -0.001569  2 14 
Italy -0.000893  2 13 
Mexico -0.001362  3 10 
Netherlands -0.000260  3 >20 
Peru -0.002792  2 17 
Philippines -0.000255  2 7 
Spain  -0.000237  2 10 
Venezuela -0.001180  2 8 
Average -0.00122292  2.33 11.5 
B.  Common-law countries 
Australia -0.000781  4 10 
Canada -0.001299  4 12 
India -0.000329 0.000264 8 13 
Ireland -0.000146  2 9 
Malaysia -0.000279 0.000225 9 13 
New Zealand -0.000864 0.000306 8 15 
Pakistan -0.000709  2 11 
South Africa -0.000284 0.000296 6 13 
Singapore -0.001285  2 12 
Thailand -0.000228 0.000458 9 15 
United Kingdom -0.000210  2 10 
USA -0.000354  5 11 
Average -0.000569583  5.08 12.0 
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Appendix 1: List of Countries and Classification of Legal Structures 
 
Civil-Law  
Countries 
Data Period Common-Law 
Countries 
Data Period 
Argentina 1985:1-2003:4 Australia 1980:1-2003:4 
Chile 1980:1-2003:4 Canada 1980:1-2003:4 
Colombia 1983:1-2003:4 India 1980:1-2003:4 
France 1980:1-2003:4 Ireland 1980:1-2003:4 
Indonesia 1980:1-2003:4 Malaysia 1980:1-2003:4 
Italy 1982:1-2003:4 New Zealand 1982:1-2003:4 
Mexico 1982:1-2003:4 Pakistan 1980:1-2003:4 
Netherlands 1980:1-2003:4 South Africa 1980:1-2003:4 
Peru 1982:1-2003:4 Singapore 1980:1-2003:4 
Philippines 1980:1-2003:4 Thailand 1980:1-2003:4 
Spain 1980:1-2003:4 United Kingdom 1980:1-2003:4 
Venezuela 1984:1-2003:4 United States of America 1980:1-2003:4 
 
In this paper, the classification whether a country legal structures is civil-law or common-law 
follow the classification used by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), which in turn rely on Reynolds 
and Flores (1989). In general, legal families come from two broad traditions: common-law, 
which is English in origin, and civil-law, which is derives from Roman law. The common-law 
family includes the law of England and those laws modelled on English law. The common-
law is formed by judges who have to resolve specific disputes.  Precedents from judicial 
decisions shape common-law.  The common-law, as well as civil-law tradition has spread 
around the world through a combination of conquest, imperialism, outright borrowing, and 
more subtle imitation. The resulting laws reflect both the influence of their families and the 
revisions specific to individual countries.  Common law has spread to the British colonies, 
including the United States, Canada, Australia, India, and many other countries (La Porta et 
al. 1998).  In this paper, there are 12 common-law countries being studied.   
 
Meanwhile, the civil-law uses statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of 
ordering legal material, and relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulates its 
rules (Merryman, 1969). In general, there are three common families of civil-law tradition: 
French, German, and Scandinavian.  This paper, however, only focus on French civil-law 
tradition due to the fact that French civil-law is the most widely distributed around the world. 
The French Commercial Code was written under Napoleon in 1807 and brought by his armies 
to Belgium, the Netherlands, and part of Poland, Italy, and Western regions of Germany.  In 
the colonial era, France extended its legal influence to the Near East and Northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa, Indochina, Oceania, and French Caribbean islands. French legal influence has 
been significant as well in Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, some of Swiss cantons, and Italy 
(Glendon et al. 1994). When the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Latin America dissolved 
in the nineteenth century, it was mainly the French civil-law that the lawmakers of the new 
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nations looked to for inspiration (La Porta et al. 1998).  There are 12 French civil- law 
countries being studied in this paper. 
 
In most cases, classification of country legal structure that based on legal origin is 
uncontroversial. In a few cases, however, although the origin of laws is clear, laws have been 
amended over time to incorporate influences from other families. For example, Thailand’s 
first laws were based on common-law but have received enormous French influence; and Italy 
is a French-civil-law country with some German influence. In these and several other cases, 
La Porta et al. (1998) have classified a country legal structure based on the origin of the initial 
law it adopted rather than on the revisions.  In the case of United States (U.S) where every 
state has their own laws, La Porta et al. (1998) relied on Delaware law because a significant 
fraction of large U.S companies are incorporated in Delaware law. Meanwhile, in case of 
Canada, classification is based on Ontario laws, even though Quebec has a system based on 
French civil law.  Thus, La Porta et al. (1998) have classified the legal structure of U.S and 
Canada as common-law. 
